活动安排
时间：2025年4月24日（周四）14:30-16:00
讲座地点：松江校区2教楼220教室
主 讲 人：冯骏 合肥工业大学经济学院 副教授
主 持 人：吴瑞璟 上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院 讲师
讲座摘要
This paper considers an infinite-horizon bilateral bargaining game with discounting between suppliers and retailers over a supply chain contract. The supply chain parties hold fairness concerns over their payoffs when making their contract offering and acceptance-or-rejection decisions. We first characterize equilibria in the bargaining game using a simplified utility model of fairness concern. We demonstrate that fairness concerns lead to multiple equilibrium belief paths when negotiating parties possess different levels of patience. We then conduct laboratory experiments to test our theoretical predictions with treatments with different discount factor profiles. We derive and order the distributions of wholesale prices and acceptance rates across treatments by utilizing theoretical results and confirm that the experimental observations are consistent with the predictions. We further estimate a structural model using experimental data and find that parties tend to follow equilibrium belief paths that favor themselves.
嘉宾简介
冯骏，合肥工业大学经济学院，特任副教授。研究领域为：行为博弈论，行为机制设计，实验经济学，以及神经经济学。主持国家自科面上项目。主要论著发表于Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Psychological Medicine, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, International Journal of the Commons.
承办单位
信息管理与决策科学系
科研与师资发展办公室
