郑捷:Promoting Cooperation by Leading: Leader-Selection Mechanism Matters in Public Goods Games

发布时间:2021-04-28浏览次数:405

  间:2021511日(周二)13:30-15:00

地点:松江校区2220

主讲人:郑捷清华大学经济管理学院经济系,副教授

主持人:杨晓兰教授

  Promoting Cooperation by Leading: Leader-Selection Mechanism Matters in Public Goods Games

讲座摘要

    We experimentally compare four leadership-selection mechanisms in public goods games. There is no empirical support found for the effectiveness of leadership from the overall treatment perspective. The purely voluntary leadership produces the worst performance in aggregate, mainly due to the uncooperative behavior in leaderless groups and the internal conflict of interest between leaders. An interesting new insight from our work is that allowing a randomly selected group member to opt to take the leadership role is superior to the fully exogenously appointed or self-appointed leadership, where such a mechanism is capable of balancing the setting of a good enough example by leaders and the reciprocal response of followers.

嘉宾简介:

郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授,博士生导师,清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,清华大学互联网产业研究院产业学者。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编,Research in Economics副编,曾担任多份SSCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学,研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和参照依赖、自我控制、互惠利他等行为问题,通过运用理论和实验相结合的分析手段研究不完全信息环境下的个体行为、多方互动、市场均衡。已有研究工作发表于American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)Games and Economic BehaviorManagement ScienceNature Communications等经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名国际期刊,且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology

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