主 题：Join if You Can't Beat: Tournament Design in Online Games
Players of online games often purchase superior virtual gears to maximize the chance of winning in games. Owners of the superior gears receive greater utility from winning games at the disappointment of others. “Paying-to-win” generates profit by sacrificing free players, which presents a critical tradeoff for the business model design of online games. Our novelty is allowing the game developer to choose the level of dominance of the superior gears strategically. We develop a game-theoretical model in which an online game sells superior gears to players for profit. The game developer can endogenize the tournament design, which affects the winning probabilities of games between paying and free player groups. Our results suggest that if the game developers can endogenize the tournament design, their decisions may undermine the player welfare. This finding appears new in the literature. The tournament design level increases with the magnitude of seeding, indicating a complementarity between the two strategies. The bulk of this work is done by Haowen Deng who is currently a PhD student at Fudan.
窦一凡，复旦大学管理学院信息管理与信息系统系副教授、博士生导师。本科和博士均毕业于清华大学经管学院，是国家自然科学基金“优青”项目获得者，受上海市“曙光人才”计划资助。目前担任信息管理领域国际顶级期刊Information Systems Research副主编，SSCI期刊Journal of Electronic Commerce Research副主编，同时是INFORMS信息管理分会的三位委员之一。窦一凡的研究工作先后被ISR、MSOM、EJOR等国际一流学术期刊发表和录用。长期关注数字经济、信息产品和商业模式等话题，目前主要研究方向为电子商务和信息系统经济学。